Features of the Establishment of the «Red» Occupation Power in Odesa (February 4-8, 1920)

Abstract

The article examines the controversial events of February 1920 surrounding the fight for Odesa between the ‘white’ and ‘red’ occupiers. The reasons for the unsuccessful ‘white’ defense of Odesa on the 4-8^th of 1920, the peculiarities of the uprising against the ‘white’ motley underground groups (Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Ukrainian communists, anarchists) and the seizure of power in the city are examined in the article as well. For the first time, we analyze the role of units of the Ukrainian Galician Army (UGA) and General Viktor Sokiri-Yakhontov in the ‘Odesa’ battles of February 1920, the competitive struggle among various rebel centers that formed in Odesa. One of the main reasons for the White Guards’ loss of Odesa was the lack of motivation among the defencists, the destruction of power, lack of authoritative leadership in the defense of the city, and the inconsistency of the command of the Entente forces in this region. The military’s orders were contradictory and delayed, which created and contributed to widespread chaos in the defense. A big mistake in the defense of Odesa was the order of General Mykola Schilling to withdraw the main forces of the ‘whites’ to the Romanian border, there were attempts to shift the defense of the city to ‘amateur’ squads created on the spot. The population of the large city (600 thousand inhabitants) was critical of the White Guards and, at the same time, was not ‘burning with desire’ to accept the harsh dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, who took advantage of the misunderstanding in the enemy camp, the ‘neutrality’ of parts of the Ukrainian Galician Army, and the gullibility of temporary allies from the camp of the Left Socialists, Ukrainian communists, and anarchists.